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Political Tie Heterogeneity and the Impact of  
Adverse Shocks on Firm Value 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Past research has recognized the contingent value of corporate political ties but 
largely neglects their heterogeneity. Drawing on the political embeddedness 
perspective and literature on emerging economy political institutions, we develop 
hypotheses regarding how political networks comprising managerial and government 
ownership ties may have different valuation effects in the face of adverse political 
shocks. Examining stock market responses to an unanticipated, high-profile political 
event in China, we find a negative valuation effect of managerial ties to municipal 
government, but an insignificant effect of government ownership ties. Further, 
companies combining managerial and ownership ties experienced less post-shock 
reduction in market value than those holding only managerial political ties. These 
findings shed light on the values of different configurations of corporate political ties 
and inform firms of potential ways to manage ubiquitous political hazards in 
emerging economies. 
 
 
Keywords: political tie, network embeddedness, tie heterogeneity, political risk, 
emerging economies, China 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate political ties encompass a wide range of individual and institutional 
linkages between firms and public authorities (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 2012). 
There is broad consensus in the literature that these ties can translate into higher 
profitability and market valuation (e.g., Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman, 2005). Yet prior 
research has also documented a darker side whereby politically connected firms suffer 
a substantial loss of firm value upon political shocks that cause a sudden removal of 
the power bases to which these ties were initially attached (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Siegel, 
2007). Given such contingency of corporate political ties, an important and 
theoretically intriguing question has so far received little scrutiny: Are all politically 
connected firms equally vulnerable to adverse shocks?  
 
This question is of particular relevance to firms operating in emerging markets. On 
the one hand, political ties may confer substantial returns to focal firms: Firms need 
political connections to guard against government extortions and obtain financial and 
regulatory resources at the government’s disposal (Wright et al., 2005; Shi et al., 2014; 
Xu and Meyer, 2013). On the other hand, emerging economies are characterized by 
considerable sociopolitical pluralism and volatility, such that a variety of interest 
groups and factions compete for political and economic benefits (Henisz and Zelner, 
2010; Kozhikode and Li, 2012). When erratic political rivalry leads opponents to 
dominate the political process, firms linked with the incumbent political group are at 
considerable risk of suffering from ‘negative cascades of discrimination, resource 
exclusion, and even expropriation and sabotage’ (Siegel, 2007: 625).  
 
We address this risk-return duality by contending that not all politically connected 
firms are equally vulnerable to adverse political shocks, for they are typically 
embedded in a variety of ties to political actors and institutions. We draw on the 
political embeddedness perspective (Michelson, 2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 
2010a) to show that, in the presence of political hazards in emerging economies,   
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different types and combinations of political ties vary in their vulnerability and 
resilience to negative shocks, which generate different valuation impacts for focal 
firms. This variance stems in turn from distinct exchange processes and mechanisms 
underlying different political tie compositions. Specifically, we develop and test 
hypotheses delineating how specific compositions of political ties are associated with 
different valuation impacts arising from exogenous political events.  
 
Most previous literature focused on a single type of dyadic ties between firms and 
governments. These ties range from personal-level linkages (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Hillman et al., 1999) to organizational-level connections such as government 
ownership ties (Li et al., 2009; Inoue et al., 2013). We operationalize the 
personal-level investigation by focusing on managerial political ties involving 
political agents serving on top management teams (TMTs) and corporate boards. 
Comparatively less attention has been paid to the organizational linkages to political 
institutions. If firms are embedded in a particular political network, 
interorganizational connections can develop in the form of minority ownership stakes 
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or government agencies. These 
business-government ties may be deliberately created by government investment in 
private businesses or stem from residual government shareholdings after privatization 
(Inoue et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2010b; Vaaler and Schrage, 2009; Xu et al., 2014). No 
matter whether the formation of such ties is of a strategic nature or not, we know little 
about if and how adverse shocks affect firms holding government ownership ties. 
 
Finally, there is emerging evidence that firms may hold a portfolio of personal and 
organizational ties with political groups (e.g., Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Zhu 
and Chung 2014). However, literature explicitly studying the differences and interplay 
between managerial political ties and organizational ties through government 
ownership is lacking. As elaborated below, these two types of ties are not synonymous, 
in that the underlying mechanism regulating the exchange relations between firms and 
political actors (i.e., managerial political ties) is different from those between firms 
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and political institutions (i.e., government ownership ties). As such, it remains unclear 
whether personal connections and organizational linkages to the same political 
network function as complements or substitutes. An adverse political shock offers an 
important setting to disentangle the differences and examine the interplay between the 
two types of political ties. 
 
We study political tie heterogeneity through an event study of China’s most 
significant political shock in the 2000s, the arrest of the top Communist Party official 
in Shanghai on September 24 2006, which signified a sudden crackdown on the 
Shanghai-based political clique from the Chinese central government. Identifying all 
manager/board-level and ownership-level ties to the Shanghai municipal government, 
we investigate how different configurations of political ties impact the market value 
of Shanghai-based publicly traded companies. Our choice of a negative event yields 
insights not offered by conventional longitudinal analysis: The identification of a 
pivotal political event helps provide a more focused and contextualized analysis of the 
value of political ties in association with unexpected reversals of political fortunes. It 
complements longitudinal datasets which often lack such contextual and 
network-level specificity.  
 
Our study makes two primary theoretical contributions. First, we add to general 
embeddedness research that calls for more multilevel studies to disentangle 
personal-level and organizational-level relationships (Kilduff and Brass, 2010; Zaheer 
et al., 2010) from the angle of political embeddedness. Rather than examining 
different types of ties in isolation, we account for the varying valuation impacts of 
different configurations of political ties. We offer a fine-grained analysis of how 
political network structure affects firm value in the face of political shocks in 
emerging markets, a context where institutional constraints on political actors are 
lacking. We elucidate the different exchange logics underlying personal-level and 
organizational-level political ties and achieve more nuanced understanding of how 
firms may address the risk-return duality of political ties in emerging economies. 
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Second, our study enriches understanding of political resources and capabilities 
embedded in corporate political ties. Given that possessing political resources 
embedded in a single type of political ties is insufficient to sustain competitive 
advantage (Bonardi, 2011; Sun et al., 2011a), firms may need a bundle of political ties 
that offer different types of resources and capabilities to navigate the complex 
political environment (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Advancing the concept of political 
tie heterogeneity, we contribute to literature on corporate political resources (Dahan, 
2005; Frynas et al., 2006; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008) by addressing the need to 
further theorize and empirically examine the roles of different types of political 
resources and capabilities in shaping corporate outcomes.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Political Embeddedness and Political Tie Heterogeneity 
 
Firms are embedded in networks of exchange relationships with other organizational 
actors to access requisite resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978/2003; Granovetter, 
1985). These interorganizational exchanges are not merely governed by arms-length 
transactions, but occur in the context of social relationships nurturing trust, 
commitment and reciprocity. Hence, social embeddedness characterizes the ways in 
which prior relations among actors both facilitate and constrain subsequent 
interorganizational exchanges (Barden and Mitchell, 2007). We treat political 
embeddedness as involving business-government exchange relationships realized by a 
multitude of individual and institutional ties to the state and its actors (Michelson, 
2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 2010a).  
 
Interorganizational networks can be an important source of rent (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Gulati et al., 2000). That is, rent-generating resources may span firm boundaries 
and be embedded in network ties. This is consistent with research conceptualizing the 
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resources acquired by a firm through its ties to government bodies and politicians as 
‘political resources’ or ‘political capabilities’ (Dahan, 2005; Frynas et al., 2006; 
Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Political ties confer legitimacy, information, and financial 
and regulatory resources to focal firms (Hillman et al., 2004). The use of relational 
political strategy is “akin to the development of social capital that is embedded in a 
continued exchange relationship between parties” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999, 829). 
 
Interorganizational relationships are necessarily multilevel (Brass et al., 2004; Barden 
and Mitchell, 2007). ‘Nodal multiplexity’ of interorganizational ties suggests variation 
in the content and nature of relational experiences between organizations and the 
individuals that compose them (Barden and Mitchell, 2007). Specifically, exchange 
relationships arise at both the personal and the organizational levels. Despite the 
overlap of the two levels of embeddedness, current research calls for more multilevel 
studies that can isolate and compare the separate mechanisms governing personal and 
organizational ties respectively (Zaheer et al., 2010, 74). As such, understanding 
which exchange ties or what combinations of these ties matter when represents a 
crucial starting point for a general theory of network tie heterogeneity.  
 
We aim to contribute conceptually by developing the idea of political tie heterogeneity 
at both personal and organizational levels of business-government exchanges, which 
hitherto has attracted little attention. At the personal level, corporate executives and 
political agents (e.g., politicians and bureaucrats) can exploit and develop reciprocal 
ties, which lead to formal linkages such as political actors sitting on the board/taking 
management positions and business people appointed to political positions.  
 
At the organizational level, interorganizational ties are concerned with long-term 
cooperative relationships between organizations where each party retains its 
operational autonomy, examples being business groups, joint ventures, and strategic 
alliances (Brass et al., 2004). Viewed through this lens, firms and political institutions 
can have exchange relationships via ownership linkages. For example, government 
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may hold residual stakes in privatized firms for strategic reasons (Vaaler and Schrage, 
2009); alternatively, government can invest in private businesses through business 
entities under its control (e.g., SOEs) to further collaboration with the private sector 
(Doh et al., 2004; Inoue et al., 2013). In addition, whereas majority state ownership 
will lead to loss of operational autonomy for focal firms, business-government 
networks can operate through minority government stakes in focal firms (Inoue et al., 
2013; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Vaaler and Schrage, 2009; Wang et al., 2012). Thus, we 
regard only minority shareholdings held by political institutions and/or SOEs as 
representing government ownership ties. 
 
While the two types of embedded ties may be complementary, the distinction between 
the two cannot be neglected: Personal-level embeddedness involves the exchange of 
particularistic favors between economic and political agents, so that organizations can 
obtain requisite resources from political actors whose personal as well as 
organizational interests have been advanced by the social elite networks. Further, 
these business-government exchanges are susceptible to departures of 
politically-connected executives and board members, which may cause the 
termination of political ties and the dilution of political resources (Sun et al., 2012: 
77). Organizational embeddedness, on the other hand, emphasizes the alignment of 
strategic goals between firms and political institutions, so that the state awards focal 
firms critical resources in exchange for firms’ accommodation and support of the 
state’s strategic objectives (Luo, 2001), which may or may not be congruent with 
those of the business and political agents. In what follows, we demonstrate how the 
distinct exchange logics governing the two types of political ties can yield different 
impacts on firm value resulting from adverse political shocks in emerging economies.  
 
Political Shocks under Weak Institutions 
 
The preceding account suggests a positive association between political ties and firm 
value: Both personal connections to prevailing political actors and organizational 
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linkages to political regimes help create a virtuous circle of favor and resource 
exchanges, translating into higher firm value through preferential regulatory policies 
(e.g., Bonardi et al., 2006) and financial resources (Inoue et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
firm value generated via political connections may be lost overnight through 
exogenous shocks in the political environment. Such unexpected changes can quickly 
turn political assets associated with the incumbent sociopolitical network into 
liabilities, as the performance of connected firms in emerging economies may vary 
dramatically depending on the fortunes of their backers (Fisman, 2001; Siegel, 2007). 
 
Despite recognition of such risk-return duality, we lack an explication of how political 
shocks may arise from interactions among the heterogeneity of political actors within 
individual firms’ networks. That is, while shocks may be exogenous to a focal firm, 
they are oftentimes endogenous to the institutional environment where the firm 
resides. Therefore, firms need to develop deeper understanding about the nature of the 
shocks by treating the political actors as a collection of heterogeneous interest groups. 
Different sociopolitical groups and political parties compete for control of different 
branches of the state, especially in the weak institutional environment of emerging 
economies (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Hence it is important to examine interactions 
among government agencies that may represent different interest groups.  
 
While sociopolitical pluralism is present in developed economies, emerging market 
political institutions experience a key institutional weakness: a lack of institutional 
checks and balances that effectively constrain the discretion and opportunism of 
interest groups in power (Henisz and Zelner, 2010). Consequently, incumbent political 
interest groups both provide sizeable preferential treatment to firms with which they 
connect and can enforce dramatic discriminatory or wealth-redistribution policies 
against businesses connected to the disadvantaged groups. The value of corporate ties 
to a cohesive political group in power is vulnerable to shocks with the potential of 
shaking or even eradicating the network’s power base. These shocks include 
unexpected election results, forced removal of a regime from office, and arrest and 
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conviction of powerful politicians.  
 
Below we examine how a negative shock would differentially affect firms holding 
various types and combinations of political ties. This heterogeneity stems from the 
objectives of actors making up the tie and from different exchange logics underlying 
the tie. We develop hypotheses regarding the valuation effects by assessing and 
comparing the vulnerability and resilience of the ties to adverse shocks. While various 
configurations of political ties can create firm value under political stability, they will 
provide different signals to investors under conditions of adverse shocks. That is, the 
more resilient (or less vulnerable) a certain type or combination of political ties is to 
an adverse shock, the smaller the loss of market value for a focal firm post shock. 
 
Managerial Political Ties 
 
TMTs and boards of directors have long been central to dealing with organizational 
interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978/2003). In the case of 
business-government relationships, managerial political ties provide opportunities for 
networking with powerful political actors, organizational legitimacy, information 
about the political process, and regulatory/financial resources controlled by political 
institutions and actors (Peng and Luo, 2000; Lester et. al., 2008). On the other hand, 
developing managerial political ties entails considerable resource investment in 
relationship building and maintenance and obligations to reciprocate favors (Park and 
Luo, 2001). Further, the value of investing in nonmarket activities has a limit, beyond 
which the investment may jeopardize a firm’s market activities (Bonardi, 2008). 
However, prior literature suggests that the benefits of managerial political ties tend to 
outweigh the costs (Hillman, 2005).  
 
According to the political embeddedness perspective, long-term relationships between 
the two parties are not governed by arm’s length transactions in which each seeks only 
to maximize short-term benefits. Whether they enter into the relationships for 
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instrumental purposes or not, the subsequent interpersonal networking allows trust 
and mutual indebtedness to develop beyond the original impetus for the relationships 
(Das and Teng, 2002). For both personal and organizational benefits, corporate 
executives can develop dense reciprocal relationships with incumbent political groups 
holding important government positions. In short, managerial political ties highlight 
enormous interpersonal attachments that result from ongoing business-government 
exchanges (Park and Luo, 2001).  
 
When an unexpected shock destroys the power base of the sociopolitical network, the 
dense social relationships and interpersonal attachments will cease to create value for 
focal firms. Executives connected to the crumbling political network would suffer 
‘guilt by association’, which refers to the economic or social punishment of a group or 
an organization for its prior relationships with illegitimate or disadvantaged 
individuals and social groups (Labianca and Brass, 2006). That is, managerial social 
capital accumulated before the shock turns into ‘social liabilities’.  
 
Being personally involved with the old camp makes it difficult for a firm to prove its 
innocence and reconstitute the broken political ties in the near term. New political 
actors will seek to distance themselves from firms with ‘undesirable’ individuals 
connected to the past, as they attempt to send a public signal that the new political 
group is different from the previous one. Moreover, if the new political forces wish to 
extract rents from these firms and use them as sociopolitical instruments, the new 
players may treat those closely connected with their political opponents as a 
significant hindrance (Smith, 2009). Consequently, these firms will likely lose the 
protective shield and preferential treatment associated with the ousted group.  
 
Finally, in a quest for their own legitimacy, incoming political actors may resort to 
overt discrimination against these firms. This adverse effect can be exacerbated by the 
lack of institutional checks and balances on the discretion of political leaders. Paucity 
of political and legal constraints makes it easy for politicians to punish these firms, so 
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long as they have adequate socioemotional and/or economic motives. Thus, the 
stronger the firm’s personal-level linkages to the ousted group, the more susceptible 
the firm will likely be to the potential negative effect:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  In the face of adverse shocks on a corporate political network, the 
stronger the managerial ties to this network, the greater the loss of firm value. 
 
Government Ownership Ties 
 
Under political stability, the presence of minority government stakes can send a signal 
to investors about the focal company’s access to crucial resources at the government’s 
disposal. With respect to residual government stakes in privatized companies, 
continued government involvement can assure private investors of state support for 
the firm (Vaalar and Schrage, 2009). When it comes to state investment in de novo 
projects, the government can serve as a ‘venture capitalist’ supplying long-term equity 
finance and legitimacy/reputation to attract further business partners and resource 
inflows (Inoue et al., 2013).  
 
In the face of a negative political shock, we expect firms with government ownership 
ties, linked via minority government shareholdings, to suffer much less, if any, from 
‘guilt by association’ and thereby to experience insignificant discriminatory activities 
from the incoming political group. This is because the underlying mechanism 
regulating business-government interaction is different from that relating to 
managerial political ties. Specifically, firms connected though ownership ties tend to 
accommodate economic and social objectives of political institutions in return for 
scarce resources and policy favors (Luo, 2001; Sun et al., 2010a).  
 
While interpersonal interactions are present in the development and functioning of 
government ownership ties (Park and Luo, 2001), this process will ceteris paribus 
generate fewer interpersonal attachments and socioemotional elements characteristic 
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of managerial political ties. On the other hand, the strength and durability of 
interorganizational ties hinge upon the degree of resource interdependence between 
the two parties and the availability of alternative partners (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978/2003; Westphal et al., 2006). That is, ownership ties will remain instrumentally 
valuable to incoming elites if these firms remain well-functioning and can help 
achieve their financial and sociopolitical goals. It is therefore unlikely that new 
political actors conduct self-cannibalization by excessively punishing them.  
 
Finally, ownership ties may be harder to terminate than managerial ties (Calomiris et 
al., 2010). Feasible alternatives are not always easy to find, and the financial and 
institutional constraints of quickly dissolving existing ownership ties serve to 
maintain the interorganizational linkages. Overall, the above arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2:  In the face of adverse shocks on a corporate political network, 
government ownership ties to this network through the holding of minority ownership 
stakes in focal firms will have a negligible effect on firm value. 
 
Interaction of Managerial Political Ties and Government Ownership Ties 
 
So far we treated managerial and ownership ties separately. Under political stability, 
the elite group in power also controls government agencies, so there can be 
considerable overlap between personal and organizational exchanges between firms 
and the state. This is particularly the case for firms simultaneously holding managerial 
and ownership ties to the prevailing political regime. The interplay of the two types of 
political ties is important but has been neglected by prior research.  
 
The social embeddedness literature suggests that multiple ties between two parties can 
strengthen dyadic reciprocation and symbiotic interdependences (Barton and Mitchell, 
2007). In the context of business-government exchanges, managerial/board 
14 
 
networking with political actors can further enhance the benefits offered from 
ownership linkages to political institutions. They can reinforce each other to facilitate 
greater and speedier flow of regulatory and financial resources to focal firms (Park 
and Luo, 2001). This complementary effect is especially salient in emerging 
economies, where government agencies are easily captured by political interest groups 
to further the latter’s agendas. 
 
On the other hand, as sociopolitical embeddedness involves both opportunities for and 
constraints on organizations, the combination of the two types of ties can also give 
rise to additional costs to focal companies. Our earlier discussion implies that 
ownership ties will on balance be beneficial when the government acts as a minority 
shareholder. The addition of politically-connected boards and TMTs may mean 
political forces have a greater say in the corporate governance process. As a result, the 
greater bargaining power of political agents vis-à-vis private shareholders can 
facilitate excessive appropriation of firm surplus, thus resulting in extra loss of firm 
value. In sum, there are both benefits and costs of combining the two types of political 
ties, but extant literature is silent on when the benefits will outweigh the costs or vice 
versa. We add greater specificity to this issue by examining how this political tie 
configuration will impact firm value in the context of adverse political shocks.  
 
When a shock shakes the incumbent elite power bases to which the focal firms are 
attached, the original overlap between personal ties and organizational ties will 
disappear. While managerial linkages to the ousted political group have been 
effectively terminated, firms’ ownership linkages to political institutions are inherited 
by the incoming political group. In this context, although guilt by personal association 
can invite subsequent discrimination against focal firms from the new political forces, 
its severity can be mitigated by the minority ownership stakes held by government 
agencies and SOEs. That is, the instrumental value of ownership stakes makes new 
elite groups hesitant to terminate resource exchanges between the two parties and 
self-cannibalize the focal companies. Thus, compared to firms connected only through 
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managerial ties, ownership ties to state organizations can serve as a buffer against the 
‘social liabilities’ associated with personal connections by helping reconstitute the 
broken business-government linkages after adverse shocks. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  In the face of adverse shocks on a corporate political network, 
government ownership ties to this network through the holding of minority ownership 
stakes in focal firms will positively moderate the negative association between 
managerial political ties and firm value. 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
Political connections have salient geographical origins (Siegel, 2007; Faccio and 
Parsley, 2009), and focusing on local political ties reduces extraneous variation arising 
from connections to other political networks. Our empirical setting is Shanghai, the 
most developed city in Mainland China. The local political economy in Shanghai 
makes the event an ideal context. While there is a high cross-regional rotation of local 
government officials in China, Shanghai remained an exception. Typical of the vast 
majority of Shanghai government officials, Chen Liangyu spent his entire 
public-sector career in Shanghai, starting from a state-owned factory manager before 
becoming a senior official in the municipal government in the 1990s, and then 
municipal Party secretary, the city’s first-in-charge, and a member of China’s ruling 
Communist Party Politburo since 2002.  
 
Political factionalism is a defining feature of Chinese politics (Shih, 2008). Chen was 
widely believed to be a key member of the Shanghai-based political clique1 in the 
Chinese Communist Party, an informal group of officials rising to prominence under 
the patronage of Jiang Zemin, China’s former leader, who was once mayor and Party 
secretary of the city and cultivated it as his power base. According to the Wall Street 
Journal (2007), this cohesive local clique facilitated the emergence of what was 
known as ‘Shanghai Inc.’: ‘giant construction projects got funded from public coffers; 
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choice assets moved out of state hands in elaborate transactions; and plum contracts 
went to the well-connected.’  
 
However, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiaobao, the successors of Jiang, had 
few prior Shanghai links but competing relationships with members of the clique. The 
purge of Chen by the central government, consequently, represented a big blow not 
only to his close friends, but to the whole political network in Shanghai. Representing 
China’s biggest political shakeup in the 2000s, ‘Mr Chen’s dismissal is being widely 
interpreted as Hu Jintao strengthening his position both within the party and the 
country as a whole.’ (BBC News, 2006) 
 
A detailed timeline of this political event is shown in Table 1. On Monday, September 
25, 2006, the state media announced the dismissal and detention of Chen in Beijing 
the day before, on the ground of his involvement in the Shanghai pension scandal. It 
was reported that at least RMB 3.2 billion ($427 million), or about one third of the 
city’s pension fund, had been illegally diverted to politically-connected firms and 
obscure private holding companies for investment in real estate and infrastructure 
projects (such as the companies mentioned in Table 1).2  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Although the pension scandal had emerged earlier when some businessmen and 
lower-level Shanghai officials were arrested, this event was largely unexpected by the 
public: Misuse of public funds was not uncommon in China, thus hardly justifying the 
arrest of a ruling Politburo member (Sun et al., 2011b). In effect, the scandal has been 
exploited by the central government to achieve a ‘partial regime change’: Our study of 
media reports and archival data suggests that no less than 30 senior government 
officials and SOE executives were dismissed, demoted, or arrested because of this 
scandal.  
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Case Illustrations 
 
Anecdotal evidence in the Shanghai corporate sector suggests that politically 
connected firms were not equally vulnerable to this shock. As noted in Table 1, the 
Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd. was directly involved in the pension scandal, as 
three of its senior executives – Wang Chengming, Han Guozhang, and Zhang 
Rongkun – were Chen’s close friends and actively engaged in the fund diversion 
activities. Despite the fact that they were jailed after the event, the listed company did 
not suffer political retaliation as government ownership stakes provide a crucial buffer 
against the shock. Inspection of its financial reports reveals that it did not experience 
reduction in bank financing from the state-controlled banking system after the shock.  
 
In contrast, another politically connected company – Shanghai Hainiao Development 
Co. Ltd. – was much less fortunate. A Shanghai-based property developer, the firm 
was controlled by Zhou Zhengyi, a business tycoon closely connected to Chen and his 
family. His real estate business received tremendous support from the municipal 
government in supplying plots in the city’s central locations. The downfall of Chen, 
however, led to the collapse of Zhou’s business empire. He was sentenced to 16 years 
in prison and his company was no longer able to obtain any land supply from the local 
government. Post hoc analysis of its annual reports finds plummeting profitability and 
external financing after 2006. Although various factors can account for the tale of the 
two firms, one crucial difference was the presence or absence of government 
ownership linkages. While the Shanghai government held ownership stakes in the 
former company, Zhou did not develop ownership ties to local government agencies, 
which might have been able to buffer this adverse shock. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
In June 2006, 162 companies were headquartered in Shanghai and listed on the 
Chinese stock market, including stock exchanges in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and 
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Shenzhen. Stock price, accounting, and ownership data for these firms were obtained 
from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. After 
deleting firms without necessary data to calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs), we have 154 firms for our empirical analysis.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
The event study approach can largely obviate the endogeneity problem as studies 
using adverse shocks as ‘quasi-experiments’3 can obtain a reasonably clean measure 
of the valuation effects of political ties. The resulting changes in market-adjusted 
stock returns can serve as an estimate of the lost value of various types of ties (Fisman, 
2001). As a negative shock damages the power base of the prior network to which 
firms are attached, different tie configurations will exhibit varying degrees of 
resilience to potential retaliation by the rival network, which should be manifested 
through investor responses.  
 
Standard event study methodology (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) is used to estimate 
companies’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We first run the following market 
model for daily returns: Rit = α + βi Rmt + εit, where Rit is the rate of return for stock i at 
time t, and Rmt is the rate of return on the market portfolio m at time t. The estimated 
intercept and coefficient prior to the unanticipated event are applied to calculate the 
abnormal return [ ] for each company.  
 
Regarding the choice of event windows, we treat September 25, 2006 (Monday) as 
day 0, when the arrest of Chen in Beijing on September 24 was released to the public. 
Information leakage before September 24 is of minor concern since the purge was 
kept strictly confidential. For example, Chen made high-profile media exposure on the 
evening of September 23 – watching the Shanghai Golden Grand Prix, an 
international track and field game hosted in Shanghai, with other senior municipal 
ˆˆ( )it it mtAR R R   
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officials (see Table 1). As such, we follow Faccio and Parsley (2009) by using event 
windows starting from trading day -1 (September 22, 2006) to allow for potential 
pre-event leakage in calculating the CARs. Event windows starting from day 0 also 
yield very similar results.  
 
Further, we agree with Faccio and Parsley (2009) that there is no reason to extend 
event windows further prior to such a sudden event. This is not least because of the 
confounding information released on day -2 (September 21), when the media reported 
that Chen accompanied national government leaders in receiving foreign delegates in 
Shanghai on the same day. Without hindsight, this information would have suggested 
to investors that Chen was politically safe, at least in the near term.  
 
With respect to the ending days of the event windows, a very long event window is 
hard to justify because of potential confounding effects (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). Meanwhile, we allow for moderate post-event drift in this context: First, 
short-window event studies may produce biased inferences from highly complex, 
infrequent events (Oler et al., 2008). The media in China is strictly state-controlled so 
that most relevant information and political implications of this event cannot be 
openly discussed. Therefore domestic investors need more time to digest its delicate 
nature. Second, as shown in Table 1, some of Chen’s associates were arrested on 
September 28 (day +3). This information served to reinforce investor belief that the 
event was targeted at the whole local political network in Shanghai. Consequently, 
CARs of each company over the event windows (-1, 2) and (-1, 3) – CARi (-1, 2) and 
CARi (-1, 3) – are obtained through aggregation of ARi for each day. 
 
Independent variables 
 
Managerial political ties. We manually collected career information on 2,577 
TMT/board members in the 154 firms, comprising all those for whom information 
was disclosed in their companies’ annual reports and other archival sources. They 
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included board directors, senior executives without board membership, and members 
of companies’ supervisory boards. Consistent with previous literature (Hillman et al., 
1999; Faccio, 2006; Sun et al., 2011b), a firm is deemed connected to the 
Shanghai-based political network if at least one TMT/board member had been a 
former government official4 or was currently a member in legislative bodies in 
Shanghai. This specification captures all personal links to the political network that 
can be identified and verified by investors. We use a binary variable PERSON_TIE to 
denote personal connections to the local network. It equals 1 if a company had former 
official(s) from the Shanghai government or current member(s) in municipal 
legislative bodies as TMT/board member(s) at the time of the event, 0 otherwise.  
 
To capture the strength of personal-level political ties, we developed a new firm-level 
index measuring the degree of a firm’s proximity to the local political power. 
Building on Kim and colleagues’ (2012) political alignment index, our firm-level 
index is constructed by accounting for two important dimensions of a firm’s political 
connectedness. First, a firm will have a closer local political connection if its 
TMT/board member(s) had a higher political status/rank in the local state authority. 
Second, the connection will be stronger if the connected person holds a more 
important position with greater decision-making power in the company. Specifically, 
we created the index as below: 
 
PERSON_INDEX = (1/2) * Gov_Rank + (1/2) * Company_Position 
 
where Gov_Rank is valued in accordance with the seniority of the highest government 
post that a company’s TMT/board member once had. We followed the official ranks 
of the Chinese bureaucracy to divide the connected people into three groups: For 
companies whose connected executives once had a position below the division level,5 
we assigned a value of 1 to Gov_Rank. Moving up the hierarchy is the division (chu) 
level officials who play a significant, albeit operational, role in government’s 
management of business affairs, so a value of 2 is assigned to Gov_Rank for firms in 
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this category. Since top positions in the Shanghai government are at the ministry (bu 
in Chinese) level and bureau (ju or si) level, Gov_Rank is assigned a value of 3 if the 
firm has the very top connections.6 
 
The second part of the index – Company_Position – concerns the company 
decision-making power held by the politically connected. Again we divide the 
connected people into three categories: Company_Position is assigned a value of 1 if 
the politically connected person does not have board membership. That is, s/he was an 
executive in charge of operational/functional aspects of the business or sitting on its 
supervisory board. While Chinese regulations mandate the establishment of two-tier 
boards in all listed companies, Chinese supervisory boards normally play a symbolic 
role. Company_Position equals 2 if the politically connected person acted as an 
independent director. Imitating the Anglo-American corporate governance system, the 
Chinese regulatory authority mandates the appointment of independent directors and 
grants them considerable power in corporate governance, such as chairing board 
sub-committees and ratifying major business transactions. Finally, Company_Position 
equals 3 if the politically connected was an executive board director, i.e. a corporate 
insider. In other words, connections are expected to generate more impacts when held 
by people with greater decision rights within a firm. 
 
Government ownership ties. Based on prior literature (Inoue et al., 2013; Vaaler and 
Schrage, 2009), we measure the strength of political ownership ties by using a 
continuous variable SHG_SHARE, which is the percentage of minority equity stakes 
held by Shanghai government agencies via their SOEs. Since the early 2000s, most 
Chinese government agencies have tended to hold ownership stakes in the 
downstream listed companies through their SOEs. We have confirmed from our data 
analysis that this is indeed the case: Government agencies do not act as immediate 
shareholders of the Shanghai-based publicly traded corporations. As listed companies 
in China are required to disclose their ten largest shareholders, we manually identify if 
minority stake holders were local SOEs in each company. This was accomplished by 
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careful study of archival information and by assistance from equity analysts with deep 
knowledge of these companies.  
 
Government minority stakes are found in 81 sample companies. Tracing the origin of 
these stakes by checking the companies’ IPO prospectuses and merger and acquisition 
records confirms that both residual government stakes and original government 
investment existed in these firms. 
 
Control variables 
 
De facto Shanghai SOEs. If a Shanghai-based SOE holds a majority equity stake in a 
downstream listed firm, we treat the listed company as a de facto SOE affiliated to the 
local government. A dummy variable SH_SOE takes the value of 1 if the Shanghai 
government owns more than 50% of the listed company’s total shares outstanding via 
its SOE(s), 0 otherwise. We find 28 companies in this category.  
 
Central government control and connections. Since the event implies a crackdown on 
the local political clique, a firm’s personal and ownership ties to central government 
need to be controlled for. We use CEN_CONTROL to denote firms controlled by 
central government agencies. This equals 1 if a company disclosed that a central SOE 
was its largest shareholder, 0 otherwise. Similarly, we use CEN_PERSON to denote 
firms that had personal connections to central government agencies, equaling 1 if a 
company had former central government official(s) being TMT/board member(s) at 
the time of the event, 0 otherwise. 
 
Other control variables. SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales revenues in 2005. AGE 
is the number of years since incorporation in China. ROA is return on assets in 2005. 
P/B Ratio is the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value at year-end 2005. 
INDUSTRY is the standard dummy variables controlling for industry-specific effects. 
MARKET TYPE is a dummy variable controlling for the specific stock exchange on 
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which a company was traded. 
 
Testing a null hypothesis 
 
Testing the null form hypothesis 2 entails a power analysis that has been applied in 
behavioral sciences (Cohen, 1988, 1990, 1992) and management research (Lane et al., 
1998; Peng, 2004). It is well known that failure to find a statistically significant 
estimated coefficient does not warrant the conclusion that the null hypothesis is true. 
However, as pointed out by Cohen (1990), the null can be “accepted” if the 
hypothesized effect is found to be of no more than negligible or trivial size by virtue 
of a power analysis. 
 
Thus, this analysis begs the question of when the effect size can be treated as 
‘nontrivial’ in testing a null. Cohen (1992) proposed operational definitions of large, 
medium, and small effect sizes. In view of our event study context involving 
observations from outside investors, we find it suitable to adopt a medium effect size, 
which ‘represents an effect likely to be visible to the naked eye of a careful observer’ 
(p. 156). Following Table 1 in Cohen (1992) and Lane et al. (1998), we consider an 
effect to be trivial if the resultant R2 from our power analysis is smaller than 0.13, the 
medium effect size.  
 
To proceed with the power analysis, we further set the significance level α (the type I 
error risk) to be equal to 0.05 or 0.01 and the power of the test to be 0.8 (so the type II 
error risk β = 0.2), which are ‘a convention proposed for general use’ (Cohen, 1992: 
156). Finally, the power analysis needs to determine the sample size necessary to 
attain the above power for the specified α and β. Referring to Table 2 in Cohen 
(1992), we note that our sample size (n= 154) is larger than all the minimum sample 
sizes required to test our null hypothesis. Hence, our null hypothesis will receive 
empirical support if the effect size is found to be greater than the R2 in association 
with the medium effect size, given the specified  α and β and the large-enough 
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sample size. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Stock market responses are shown in Table 2. For the full sample, the sign and the 
significance of the CARs are very sensitive to the event window chosen, with no 
consistent result emerging. The table also presents a classification of sample firms 
into two broad categories: Those with personal connections to and/or equity stakes 
held by the local political authority and those without. Clearly, the stock market on 
average discounted the politically-embedded group with a significant decline in CARs 
ranging from 1.4% to 2.2% over the event windows ending on day +3 or +4, when the 
purge of other Shanghai officials became publicly known. These results are greater 
than the percentage losses reported in some previous studies of negative events (e.g., 
Fisman (2001, -0.95%) and Faccio & Parsley (2009, -1.7%)).  
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Using CAR (-1, 4) as a case to illustrate the monetary value of the negative impact, 
the market-adjusted loss of 2.1% for the 127 politically connected companies is 
equivalent to a reduction of 10.59 billion RMB ($1.33 billion) in these companies’ 
market value over these six trading days, which accounts for about 1% of Shanghai’s 
GDP in 2006. The magnitude of this shock is more substantial in proportional terms 
than estimates in some prior studies: Jayachandran (2006) reports that the loss of 
market capitalization in U.S. companies previously making donations to the 
Republican Party amounted to $76.9 billion, or 0.76% of U.S. GDP in 2001, when 
Senator Jeffords’ unexpected defection from the Republican Party tipped the control 
of the U.S. Senate to the Democrats. More dramatically, a recent study of the impact 
of the rise of the Nazis in Germany suggests that the market value appreciation 
enjoyed by companies connected with the Nazi movement in early 1933 amounted to 
0.71% of German GDP in the same year (Ferguson and Voth, 2008). 
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations among the variables 
used in subsequent regressions, with several noteworthy features. First, the mean of 
the binary variable PERSON_TIE is 68.8%, indicating that a majority of sample firms 
maintained personal connections to the local political authority. The mean of 
SHG_SHARE is 11.5%, suggesting that the Shanghai government held substantial but 
non-controlling stakes in 81 of our 154 sample companies. Second, while the negative 
correlation between CARs and SHG_SHARE is not significant, both PERSON_TIE 
and PERSON_INDEX are negatively correlated with CARs at 1% or 5% significance 
levels. Third, both CEN_CONTROL and CEN_PERSON exhibit strong negative 
correlations with various measures of local political ties (i.e., SHG_SHARE and 
PERSON_TIE). This suggests that both central and local political ties cluster around 
different groups of companies, so that few companies simultaneously develop 
personal and/or ownership ties to both local and central authorities. Finally, the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the explanatory variables are smaller than 2.5, 
far below the conventional cut-off level, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
concern in the empirical analysis. 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
We perform multivariate regressions investigating the relationship of firm-level CAR 
(-1, 2) and CAR (-1, 3) to the composition of local political ties, with results shown in 
Table 4. Models (1) and (5) only contain control variables. The positive effect of 
CEN_CONTROL aside, no other variables show significant effects on CARs.  
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Regressions in the remaining models concern the valuation effects of different types 
and compositions of local political ties. Strongly supporting Hypothesis 1, the 
marginal effect on CARs of managerial ties to the Shanghai-based political network is 
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significantly negative. When we use the continuous measurement of personal political 
ties, consistent supportive results are present in models (2) and (6): Noting that a 
firm’s PERSON_INDEX is zero if it was not connected to the local government 
through personal connections, a one-unit increase in a firm’s political proximity to the 
local regime would lead to about a 0.8% discount in CAR (-1, 2) (p < 0.05). 
 
Regarding the marginal valuation effect of SHG_SHARE, the estimated coefficients 
in models (2) and (6) are statistically insignificant, implying that the valuation effect 
of government ownership ties is insignificantly different from zero following the 
shock. This is a necessary but insufficient condition to “accept” the null form 
hypothesis 2. In models (3), (4), (7), and (8), we test Hypothesis 3 regarding 
interactions between managerial ties and ownership ties. Irrespective of using binary 
or continuous measures of managerial political ties, regression results offer 
unambiguous support for this hypothesis. That is, government ownership ties play a 
significant moderating role of buffering against the negative shocks on companies 
having managerial connections to the local political network.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the power analysis testing the null hypothesis 2. In 
models (9), (10), (13), and (14), we regress CAR (-1, 2) and CAR (-1, 3) simply on 
the measures of the two key independent variables. While the managerial political ties 
are negatively correlated with the CARs, there is again no statistical association 
between government ownership ties and the CARs. Moreover, the corresponding R2’s 
are much smaller than the medium size threshold – 0.13, so we can conclude that 
hypothesis 2 can be accepted with the power of the test greater than 0.8 and the risk of 
type II error smaller than 0.2. In the rest of the models in Table 5, we add more 
control variables regarding other political linkages. Again, the results remain very 
similar, offering consistent support for hypothesis 2. 
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
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Robustness Checks 
 
The portfolio approach. Besides conventional regressions of CARs on firm 
characteristics, the portfolio approach is also used in the finance literature. A recent 
survey of event studies (Kothari and Warner, 2007: 19-20) advocates combining the 
two methods and checking if there is broad consistency so as to enhance the 
robustness of future event studies. Thus, we employ the portfolio approach to 
investigate if investors could have reaped significant stock returns by forming certain 
trading portfolios in line with the configuration of the political ties in our sample. 
Since the adverse shock is expected to generate a detrimental effect on firms with 
managerial and/or ownership ties to the Shanghai government, a hypothetical 
prescient investor should be able to earn significant returns by taking advantage of 
such information over (-1, 2) and (-1, 3).  
 
Specifically, we construct three equal-weighted portfolios during the event periods: 
The first is long (buy shares) in companies without personal connections to the 
Shanghai government and short (sell shares) in those with personal ties; the second is 
long in companies whose PERSON_INDEX is higher than or equal to the median (i.e., 
2.5), and short in those with no personal ties (i.e., PERSON_INDEX = 0); the third is 
long in companies without minority ownership stakes held by the Shanghai 
government (SHG_SHARE), and short in those with minority stakes. To implement 
the portfolio time-series regressions, we follow Berkman et al. (2010) to specify the 
following models: 
 
R(Without 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑂𝑁_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑡 ) − R(With 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑂𝑁_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡               (1) 
 
R(Min 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑂𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑡 ) − R(High 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑂𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                 (2) 
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R(Without 𝑆𝐻𝐺_𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑡 ) − R(with 𝑆𝐻𝐺_𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                 (3) 
 
R(Without PERSON_TIEt) and R(With PERSON_TIEt) are the respective returns for 
day t on firms without and with personal-level political ties; R(Min 
PERSON_INDEXt) and R(High PERSON_INDEXt) are respective returns for day t 
on firms whose PERSON_INDEX are zero and no smaller than 2.5 in the sample; 
R(Without SHG_SHAREt) and R(With SHG_SHAREt) are the respective returns for 
day t on firms without and with government minority stakes. EVENT is a dummy 
variable equaling 1/n for the dates within the event window of n days, and 0 otherwise, 
where n = 4 in the window (-1, 2) and n = 5 in the window (-1, 3). 
MARKET_RETURNt is the return for day t on the value-weighted market portfolio of 
firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. Each model is estimated over all the 241 
trading days in 2006 (i.e., t = 1, … , 241). 
 
Table 6 reports the performances of the three portfolios by showing the estimates of 
𝛽1 with different firm samples. Hypothesis 1 receives support in the whole sample: 
An investor holding the first two portfolios during the event periods would reap 
positive returns, the statistical significance of which is present in most cases. For 
example, if an investor had longed the stocks of companies with managerial political 
ties to the Shanghai government and meanwhile shorted the stocks without these ties 
during the event window (-1, 2), s/he could have earned a 2.3% investment return 
over the four trading days (equivalent to 144% of annualized investment return). 
Moreover, this positive return could have been increased to 4.9% (equivalent to 295% 
of annualized return), had s/he concentrated on a subsample without Shanghai 
government equity stakes over the same event window.  
 
In contrast, investors holding the third portfolio would have failed to reap any 
significant returns during the event windows. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
which suggests that trading on the basis of minority ownership stakes is unlikely to 
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yield investment returns. This result also corroborates the support for Hypothesis 2 
reported above using the power analysis.  
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
In support of Hypothesis 3, the first two portfolios would have failed to generate 
positive returns if the companies traded had been constrained to those with ownership 
ties to the Shanghai government during the event periods. The estimated coefficients – 
the investment returns – in the two subsamples are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. This suggests that, facing this political shock, minority government ownership 
plays a significant buffering role for companies holding managerial ties to the local 
political authority. In sum, results of the portfolio approach are consistent with those 
in the preceding regression analysis and provide further corroborating evidence. 
 
Alternative definition of government ownership ties. We also consider the case when 
Shanghai government agencies held minority stakes but remained the largest 
shareholders via their SOEs in the listed firms. If we assume that these companies 
were still under operating control by the largest shareholders, these sample companies 
may also be classified as de facto Shanghai SOEs. Thus, we narrow down our original 
definition of government ownership ties to companies where local SOEs did not act as 
their largest shareholders. Specifically, a binary variable OWN_TIE is equal to 1 if a 
listed company’s largest shareholder is unrelated to the Shanghai government, but one 
or several Shanghai-based SOEs held ownership blocks in the company, 0 otherwise. 
Correspondingly, the control variable SH_SOE now takes the value of 1 not only for 
firms with majority stakes held by Shanghai-based SOEs, but also for those with local 
SOEs acting as minority largest shareholders. 
 
On the basis of this new classification, we re-tested the second and third hypotheses 
through the conventional regression analysis, the power analysis, and the portfolio 
approach. All the estimation results are very similar to those reported in Tables 4-6. 
30 
 
Due to space limit, these results are not reported here but are available upon request.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Prior research on corporate political ties recognizes the general contingency of their 
value for focal firms, but falls short of examining the heterogeneity of these ties. 
Emerging economies are characterized by political hazards that are difficult to 
regulate by institutional checks and balances. As a result, firms need to develop a 
deeper understanding of how different corporate political ties vary in their 
vulnerability and resilience to negative shocks. To this end, we unpack the exchange 
process embedded in different types and combinations of political ties. We have 
developed and tested hypotheses delineating how specific compositions of political 
ties are associated with different valuation impacts arising from the most dramatic 
political shock in China in the 2000s. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Students of interorganizational relationships have long called for more in-depth 
studies to distinguish the respective mechanisms regulating personal-level and 
organizational-level embeddedness (Barden and Mitchell, 2007; Brass et al., 2004; 
Zaheer et al., 2010). However, attempts to understand the heterogeneity of corporate 
political ties and its impacts on corporate outcomes remain virtually absent in the 
literature. Most political connection research overlooks that firms are typically 
embedded in a political constellation encompassing different levels/dimensions of 
business-government exchanges. This approach, however, risks theoretical 
misspecification and misleading empirical findings. By simultaneously examining 
managerial political ties, government ownership ties, and their interactions, we 
investigate how nodal multiplexity of corporate political ties influences firm outcomes 
in the emerging economy context. 
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The importance of such heterogeneity would be less critical if adverse political shocks 
did not characterize emerging economies. Under political stability, interpersonal 
exchanges embedded in managerial political ties and interorganizational exchanges 
embedded in government ownership ties are oftentimes intertwined and overlapping, 
as political elites are also in charge of public authorities. It is, however, in the 
presence of adverse shocks that the criticality of political tie heterogeneity manifests 
itself for focal firms.  
 
Specifically, the value of managerial political ties can be quickly erased after the 
shock that damages the local political network. ‘Guilt by association’ makes it hard to 
reconstitute these broken ties in the near term and may invite unfavorable treatment 
from rival political groups. In comparison, the exchange of resources and favors 
involves negligible personal and socioemotional elements at the interorganizational 
level. Absent allies of political opponents holding executive/board positions, firms 
with only ownership ties are less susceptible to ‘guilt by association’ and find it easier 
to realign themselves with incoming political elites. Furthermore, for focal firms with 
managerial connections, our study suggests that ownership linkages help alleviate the 
negative impacts of personal-level liabilities. Thus, a combination of personal and 
organizational ties to local political authority is instrumental in managing the 
risk-return duality prevailing in emerging economies. 
 
In sum, our study integrates the political embeddedness perspective and the literature 
on emerging economy political institutions to unravel a more nuanced picture of 
political tie utilization. In doing so, we extend the conventional perspective adopted in 
developed economies, which portrays political ties as facilitators of 
business-government transactions on an implicit political market (Bonardi et al., 2005; 
Kingsley et al., 2012). This paves the way for more disaggregated, multilevel 
investigations into the impacts of political embeddedness on firm outcomes across 
different contexts. 
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Our study also has important implications for existing studies of corporate political 
activity through the political resources lens. While corporate political ties are a crucial 
element of firm-specific political resources to generate rents (Dahan, 2005; Frynas et 
al., 2006; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), prior research largely neglects the 
heterogeneity of resources that can be supplied by different types and bundles of 
political ties. We have taken a critical step forward by examining both the direct and 
interactive effects of two types of political ties. The results reveal that minority 
government ownership acts as a buffer against the deleterious valuation effect that 
personal ties can have in the aftermath of negative political shocks.  
 
Echoing Bonardi’s (2011: 250) argument that ‘future work on political resources 
needs to be strongly anchored in a theory of how political environments work,’ our 
study suggests that the value of heterogeneous political ties is contingent on the 
dynamics of political fragmentation and volatility in emerging economies. The 
distinct exchange processes underlying personal and organizational linkages imply 
different rent-generating mechanisms, which in turn give rise to varying degrees of 
vulnerability/resilience to political perturbations. Therefore, our findings highlight the 
need to further understand the heterogeneity and bundles of political resources by 
studying the interactions between different types and compositions of non-market 
resources and changing non-market environments. 
 
Managerial and Ethical Implications 
 
Our study has profound implications for senior executives doing business in emerging 
economies. Corporate political ties may reflect focal firms’ umbilical cords to the state 
embedded in past institutional legacies or be deliberately created by focal firms to 
co-opt powerful political forces. In both cases, adroit management of these ties has 
proved crucial for firms to navigate the challenging business environments. As recent 
research hints at (Bonardi, 2011; Sun et al., 2012; Shi et al., 2014) and our present 
study shows, basing corporate political strategy on a single, however high-profile, 
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political tie can be particularly risky. Instead, firms may rely on a portfolio of 
connections to generate the requisite political resources, which themselves differ in 
nature and function.  
 
Concretely, the prevailing risk-return duality in the non-market environment prompts 
managers to contemplate strategies of both capturing sizeable government resources 
and mitigating political risks. While developing personal-based connections with 
politicians can result in significant benefits for focal firms, they have to be balanced 
by the vulnerability of the ties to adverse political shocks. Government ownership ties, 
on the other hand, can play an important risk absorption role in buffering firms from 
these shocks. Therefore, a combination of personal and organizational ties to the 
incumbent political regime can be beneficial for focal firms, since they can enjoy their 
managerial connections absent adverse shocks, while relying on organizational ties to 
reduce the likelihood of falling victim to unpredictable power struggles. 
 
Closely related to these managerial implications are the broader ethical ramifications 
for both indigenous and foreign firms operating in emerging economies. The 
corporate political strategy literature has been criticized as being insensitive to 
business ethics issues, for some practices are ethically questionable and sometimes 
border on the corrupt (den Hond et al., 2014; Mantere et al., 2009). While we do not 
directly address the effects of different types of political ties on corporate reputation, 
our analysis does imply that political ties are not equally subject to ethical problems.  
 
Like all organizations, political institutions have both ‘personal faces’ represented by 
individual political actors and ‘organizational faces’ endorsed by their collective 
interests. In reality, firms have resource exchanges with political institutions through 
both of these interfaces. The presence of faces of political elites in focal firms may 
raise ethical concerns from the public even under political stability. The problem can 
be more salient in the presence of adverse shocks, when the legitimacy and images of 
the focal companies are damaged by their association with certain politicians. In view 
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of this risk, our research reminds practitioners of the importance of managing 
government relations through organizational-level interfaces. Keeping some distance 
from personal-level agendas but highlighting organizational-level collaboration can at 
least mitigate possible ethical concerns and contribute to more sustainable 
business-government exchanges. Hence, development of reciprocal relationships with 
the state should be anchored more on the alignment of organizational objectives than 
on particularistic favor exchanges with individual political leaders. In emerging 
economies, this ethical challenge seems likely to persist while institutional voids 
remain and vary between different economies as they develop their institutional 
infrastructures at different rates (Hoskisson et al., 2013).    
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Our study provides a snapshot of how the composition of heterogeneous political ties 
impact firm value upon a high-profile political shock in the world’s largest emerging 
economy. While we have undertaken a careful analysis of the relevant qualitative 
information related to this shock, it is evident that more insights can be generated in 
future by longitudinal qualitative studies which trace the evolution of how firms 
develop, exploit, or terminate different types and combinations of political ties both in 
stable periods and following shocks. Such research will enrich our initial finding and 
deepen our knowledge about how the underlying mechanisms regulating the various 
political ties co-evolve with the business and institutional environments. 
 
As we are interested in comparing and contrasting interpersonal and 
interorganizational ties between business and government, we focused on managerial 
political and government ownership ties because they are salient representations of 
these broader constructs in the current research context. However, we do not claim 
that this classification exhausts the typology of political tie heterogeneity in both 
personal and organizational dimensions. At the personal level, our measure of 
managerial ties is appropriate for an event study since it incorporates all the verifiable 
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information that an outside investor can garner about the personal linkages to the local 
regime that the listed companies could have. In other contexts, however, we may need 
to find ways of identifying more informal linkages between business people and 
politicians. This is an empirical challenge that future qualitative and survey research 
can help to tackle.  
 
With respect to ownership ties, we acknowledge that some are not strategically 
created by focal firms but are residual government holdings following privatization. 
Clearly, basing a nonmarket strategy on government ownership ties may have very 
limited scope in many circumstances. On the other hand, the strategic retention of 
minority stakes signals that the focal firms are instrumental in helping achieve a 
regime’s financial or policy goals (Vaaler and Schrage, 2009). Hence, firms can 
exploit such strategic interdependence and manage the residual holdings as a certain 
type of political resources. That being said, ownership ties are not the only way 
through which business firms and governments interact at the organizational level. 
Affiliation to government agencies (Wang et al., 2012), participation in 
quasi-government industry associations (Jia, 2014), and joint ventures established 
between multinationals and host-country SOEs (Sun et al., 2010a) are among the 
various examples of organizational linkages between firms and the state. Future 
research might usefully examine how different types of these linkages interact with 
personal level political ties to shape firm outcomes. 
 
Finally, we do not address the feasibility and consequences of a scenario where focal 
firms simultaneously develop multiple ties to competing political groups. Few 
companies in our sample had personal and/or ownership ties to both local and central 
authorities at the same time. However, this does not preclude the presence of 
‘bets-hedging’ ties to rival networks in China and other emerging economies 
(Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012; Zhu and Chung, 2014). Future studies can 
contribute to the political strategy literature by developing datasets focused on 
achieving a deeper understanding of the formation and performance consequences of 
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different political tie configurations. 
 
In sum, corporate political ties are widespread around the world, but compared to 
interfirm network embeddedness, we know much less about how the content and 
structure of political embeddedness shape firm outcomes. By disentangling 
managerial ties to political actors and ownership ties to political institutions and 
examining their interactions, we hope our study can open the door to future research 
that unravels the nuances of corporate political activities through political tie 
utilization across different institutional contexts. 
 
NOTES 
[1] For more information, please visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_clique. 
[2] More information about this scandal can be accessed by visiting the following 
websites: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Liangyu and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_pension_scandal. 
[3] They refer to ‘exogenous shocks such as policy changes or other unanticipated 
events that enable identification of causal effects’ (Oxley et al., 2010: 384).  
[4] The Civil Servant Law of China stipulates that a public servant not hold a 
concurrent post in any profit-making organization. Consistent with the legal 
requirement, we did not find any acting Shanghai government officials sitting on the 
boards or holding executive positions in the sample companies. 
[5] This means that these people were low-rank bureaucrats before moving to the 
business sector. 
[6] There are few connections at the ministry level in our sample, so we group the two 
levels of observations. Bureau-level officials in Shanghai wield enormous power over 
business activities, such as the approval of land use and investment projects.  
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Table 1 The Timeline of the Shanghai Pension Scandal 
 
Time  Events 
July17 2006 
 (1) Zhu Junyi, Head of the Labor and Social Security Bureau in 
the Shanghai Municipal Government detained for investigating 
the misuse of the city pension fund. 
 (2) Zhang Rongkun, Board Chairman of Fuxi Investment 
Holdings Corporation detained by police. It was revealed that a 
large amount of the city’s pension fund had been illicitly funneled 
to this private holding company for its investment in real estate 
and infrastructure projects in Shanghai. 
August 8 2006 
 Han Guozhang, Deputy CEO of Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd. 
detained for questioning. Zhang Rongkun was the company’s vice 
board chairman and Fuxi Investment Holdings became the second 
largest shareholder of this public company during its privatization 
process in 2004. It was revealed that the funds (RMB 0.96 billion) 
used to acquire the company stakes originated largely from the 
city’s pension fund. 
August 14 2006 
 Wang Chengming, Board Chairman and CEO of Shanghai 
Electric Group Co. Ltd. detained in relation to the pension fund 
scandal. 
August 24 2006 
 Qin Yu, Governor of Baoshan District in Shanghai detained for 
interrogation. He was Chen’s former secretary and widely 
believed to be Chen’s protégé. 
September 23 2006 
 Chen and other Shanghai city officials watched the Shanghai 
Golden Grand Prix, an international track and field game, in the 
evening. This is the last time Chen exposed himself to the public 
before his ouster. 
September 24 2006 
 Chen was informed to attend the Politburo meeting in Beijing, 
where he was detained for corruption charges and removed from 
all the official posts. 
September 25 2006  
 The news was released by Xinhua News, the official media in 
China. 
September 28 2006 
 (1) Sun Luyi, Vice-Secretary-General of Shanghai Communist 
Party Committee, was detained for interrogation. 
 (2) Wang Chengming and a CEO of a local SOE (a close friend 
of Chen’s) officially removed from their posts. 
April 11 2008 
 Chen sentenced to 18 years in prison on charges of financial 
fraud, abuse of power, and accepting bribery. 
 
Source: The authors’ collection of archival data and media reports. 
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Table 2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in Shanghai-based  
Publicly Listed Companies 
 
 
Event 
Window 
Full Sample (n = 154) 
Companies connected to 
local political networks    
(n = 127) 
Companies lacking local 
political embeddedness    
(n = 27) 
CAR t-statistic CAR t-statistic CAR t-statistic 
       
-1, 1 0.005 1.235 -0.001 -0.173 0.033** 2.429 
 
-1, 2 0.002 0.473 -0.005 -1.155 0.034*** 2.643 
 
-1, 3 -0.007 -1.474 -0.014*** -2.838 
 
0.024* 1.624 
 
-1, 4 -0.015*** -2.964 
 
-0.021*** -4.217 
 
0.016 1.139 
0, 1 0.004 1.119 -0.000 -0.036 0.024** 2.477 
 
0, 2 -0.000 -0.073 -0.006* -1.627 
 
0.026*** 2.736 
0, 3 -0.009** -2.220 
 
-0.014*** -3.269 
 
0.016 1.497 
0, 4 -0.017*** -3.962 
 
-0.022*** -4.913 
 
0.009 0.862 
 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 CAR(-1,2) 0.002 0.053 1            
2 CAR(-1,3) -0.007 0.060 0.949 1           
3 AGE 11.305 4.051 -0.070 -0.149 1         2.47 
4 ROA 0.032 0.083 -0.288 -0.255 -0.153 1        1.58 
5 SIZE 21.060 1.689 -0.106 -0.043 -0.235 0.331 1       1.65 
6 P/B Ratio 3.150 4.383 -0.092 -0.121 0.063 -0.087 -0.155 1      1.49 
7 CEN_CONTROL 0.234 0.424 0.144 0.142 -0.266 0.079 0.124 -0.132 1     1.87 
8 CEN_PERSON 0.260 0.440 0.064 0.045 -0.008 -0.032 0.103 -0.033 0.373 1    1.39 
9 SH_ SOE 0.182 0.384 -0.092 -0.065 -0.094 0.158 0.149 0.060 -0.221 -0.164 1   1.88 
10 SHG_SHARE 0.115 0.159 -0.036 -0.028 0.134 -0.052 0.034 -0.060 -0.333 -0.199 -0.340 1  1.89 
11 PERSON_TIE 0.688 0.464 -0.213 -0.159 0.075 0.188 0.168 -0.049 -0.258 -0.305 0.245 0.284 1 1.58 
12 PERSON_INDEX 1.795 1.264 -0.216 -0.155 0.060 0.161 0.197 -0.051 -0.264 -0.286 0.277 0.286 0.959 1.60 
 
Note: Correlations with absolute values greater than 0.155 are significant at 5% level. (N=154) 
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Table 4 Regressions of CARs on Political Tie Compositions 
 
 CAR (-1, 2) CAR (-1, 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INTERCEPT -0.036(-0.492) -0.034(-0.468) -0.016(-0.215) -0.018(-0.243) -0.088(-1.206) -0.086(-1.190) -0.066(-0.914) -0.068(-0.942) 
AGE 0.001(0.815) 0.001(1.063) 0.001(0.877) 0.001(0.852) 0.000(0.353) 0.001(0.546) 0.000(0.333) 0.000(0.325) 
ROA -0.091*(-1.689) -0.074(-1.380) -0.080(-1.513) -0.074(-1.371) -0.083(-1.580) -0.070(-1.326) -0.077(-1.479) -0.070(-1.335) 
SIZE -0.002(-0.829) -0.001(-0.477) -0.002(-0.716) -0.002(-0.800) -0.001(-0.280) -0.000(-0.006) -0.001(-0.271) -0.001(-0.333) 
P/B Ratio -0.000(-0.415) -0.001(-0.564) -0.001(-0.521) -0.000(-0.457) -0.001(-0.619) -0.001(-0.728) -0.001(-0.684) -0.001(-0.636) 
CEN_CONTROL 0.021**(1.984) 0.020*(1.723) 0.018(1.618) 0.019*(1.687) 0.021**(2.000) 0.020*(1.779) 0.019*(1.667) 0.020*(1.740) 
CEN_PERSON -0.004(-0.408) -0.008(-0.817) -0.007(-0.699) -0.007(-0.710) -0.005(-0.593) -0.009(-0.899) -0.007(-0.771) -0.007(-0.796) 
SH_SOE 0.001(0.138) 0.007(0.543) 0.014(1.078) 0.012(0.899) 0.002(0.153) 0.006(0.506) 0.014(1.113) 0.012(0.960) 
PERSON_TIE    -0.029***(-2.674)    -0.027**(-2.524) 
PERSON_INDEX  -0.008**(-2.096) -0.012***(-2.917) 
  
-0.006*(-1.685) -0.011***(-2.706) 
 
SHG_SHARE  0.012(0.393) -0.081(-1.517) -0.078(-1.401) 
 
0.012(0.383) -0.091*(-1.744) -0.086(-1.579) 
SHG_SHARE* PERSON_TIE 
 
 0.122*(1.895) 
  
 0.134**(2.126) 
SHG_SHARE* PERSON_INDEX 
 
0.049**(2.124) 
   
0.054**(2.394)  
R2 0.390 0.411 0.431 0.425 0.549 0.559 0.578 0.574 
F statistics 3.62*** 3.57*** 3.70*** 3.61*** 6.89*** 6.49*** 6.69*** 6.59*** 
N = 154. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, with *, **, and *** mark significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively (two-tailed tests).  
All regressions shown in the table have controlled for firms’ two-digit industry affiliation and stock exchanges where they were traded. 
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Table 5 Power Analysis Testing the Null Hypothesis of Government Ownership Ties 
 
 CAR (-1, 2) CAR (-1, 3) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
INTERCEPT 0.018** 0.018** 0.013 0.014 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.000 
 (2.400) (2.405) (1.274) (1.342) (0.684) (0.767) (-0.091) (0.027) 
SHG_SHARE 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.025 0.024 
 (0.342) (0.323) (0.629) (0.562) (0.218) (0.224) (0.632) (0.612) 
PERSON_INDEX -0.009***  -0.009**  -0.008*  -0.007  
 (-2.704)  (-2.301)  (-1.915)  (-1.641)  
PERSON_TIE  -0.025***  -0.024**  -0.021**  -0.020* 
  (-2.664)  (-2.273)  (-1.961)  (-1.701) 
CEN_CONTROL   0.015 0.015   0.020 0.020 
   (1.295) (1.291)   (1.481) (1.480) 
CEN_PERSON   -0.003 -0.004   -0.005 -0.005 
   (-0.318) (-0.381)   (-0.384) (-0.443) 
SH_SOE   0.002 -0.000   0.004 0.003 
   (0.118) (-0.000)   (0.257) (0.201) 
         
R2 0.047 0.046 0.059 0.058 0.024 0.026 0.039 0.040 
 
N = 154. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, with *, **, and *** mark significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 6 Portfolio Performances by Different Political Tie Compositions 
 
 
Portfolios 
Without PERSON_TIE vs. 
With PERSON_TIE 
Min PERSON_INDEX vs. 
High PERSON_INDEX 
Without 
SHG_SHARE vs. 
With SHG_SHARE 
  
Whole sample (N=154)  
(-1,2) 
0.023*** 
(3.110) 
0.027*** 
(4.080) 
0.013 
(1.370) 
(-1,3) 
0.019 
(1.580) 
0.022* 
(1.850) 
0.013 
(1.210) 
    
Subsample without Shanghai government equity stakes (N=45)  
(-1,2) 
0.049*** 
(7.940) 
0.040** 
(6.590) 
 
(-1,3) 
0.041** 
(2.110) 
0.030 
(1.560) 
 
  
Subsample with positive SHG_SHARE (N=81)  
(-1,2) 
0.014 
(0.700) 
0.011 
(0.530) 
 
(-1,3) 
0.020 
(0.930) 
0.019 
(0.830) 
 
 
T = 241. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, with *, **, and *** mark significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively (two-tailed tests). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
